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invalid" in Missouri, yet an ounce of prevention might be worth
a pound of cure. And to obviate the chance of any question under
the state constitution, provision might well be made allowing
the state to zone the land "use" and provide the measure of con-
•trol which the state may exercise over it."
It is submitted, however, that in the constitutional revision
too much should not be provided in relation to zoning practices,
for zoning has just been born into a rapidly changing world and
to hedge it in with too stringent limitations, or those that may
in the future become so, could gravely hinder its growth toward
the public good.
R. J. W.
THE PROBLEM OF EXCESS CONDEMNATION
Excess condemnation is a subject which has been widely dis-
cussed' and greatly controverted. Under the present Missouri
constitutional provision,2 which is representative of the majority
of states, property may be taken only when it is reasonably neces-
sary to the specific purpose of the public improvement for which
the condemnation was instituted, and when the improvement
could not be accomplished without the use of such property.3
Excess condemnation would give the state or municipal govern-
ment the authority to condemn in excess of property directly
xestricted; but a use which is different without being inconsistent is not
"spot zoning." Higbee v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. (1940) 235 Wis. 91, 292
N. W. 320.
65. Munro, A Danger Spot in the Zoning Movement (May 1931) 155-
Part II The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ence 202, 205: "The practice of spot zoning has been responsible for much
chicanery and political favoritism at the city hall. Small parcels of land,
sometimes single lots, are lifted bodily out of one zone and placed in an-
other, while all the surrounding land remains as before. * * * There is
need for a halt in the freehanded practice of spot zoning for the benefit
of anyone'who happens to have sufficient influence with the public authori-
ties. The inconsistencies and the palpable inequities which accompany this
practice are fraught with danger to the whole zoning movement" Bassett,
Zoning (1936) 122 and 145.
66. Mueller v. Hoffmeister Undertaking and Livery Co. (1938) 343 Mo.
430, 121 S. W. (2d) 775.
67. 4 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, State and
Local Government in New York (1938) 363.
1. See, e. g., Cushman, Excess Condemnation (1917); 1 Nichols, Eminent
"Domain (2d ed. 1917) 177, §63; Steiner, Excess Condemnation (1938) 3
Mo. L. Rev. 1; Note (1932) 18 Va. L. Rev. 580; Note (1932) 6 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 196.
2. Mo. Const. (1875) art. II, §20.
3. See cases cited note 12, infra.
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required for the particular public improvement. The property
taken would not be directly used by the public as a part of the
improvement but would be sold to private persons for various
reasons or retained for a use not specified in the condemnation.
4
Excess condemnation has been used with varying degrees of suc-
cess in England, in various countries on the continent of Europe,
and in Canada.- However, success from a social or economic
viewpoint is not the main problem in this country. If used in
this country, excess condemnation must be valid under the United
States and state constitutions.6
The right to use eminent domain for the purpose of taking
private property is restricted in every instance to those situa-
tions in which the property is to be taken for the public use.
Decisions in every jurisdiction hold that there may not be a
taking for a public use and then a diverting of the land into
private hands for a non-public purpose.7 What is a public use
is not defined in any statute or constitution, but any definition
must be sought in the decisions of the courts.8 Even then, there
4. Cushman, Excess Condemnation (1917) 2.
5. Excess condemnation was used by Napoleon III in order to pay for
his parks and boulevards. It has also been tried in Belgium, Germany,
Hungary, and the Scandinavian countries. More recently it has been used
in England and Canada with a fair degree of success. These countries
do not, however, have constitutions under which the question of the validity
of excess condemnation arises. For the most part their legislatures are
supreme, and a statute authorizing the condemnation in excess is all that
is necessary. See Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency, Excess Condemna-
tion (No. 84, 1918) 51 et seq.; Cushman, Excess Condemnation (1917)
passim; 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain (2d ed. 1917) 179.
6. Cushman, writing in 1917, indicated that a number of states had
passed statutes authorizing excess condemnation. (Excess Condemnation
(1917) 224-29). Statutes have generally been found inadequate in the
absence of constitutional authorization, for the courts either so construed
the acts as to limit their application and preclude extensive use, or they
declared the acts invalid. See, e. g., Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Philadelphia (1913) 242 Pa. 47, 88 Atl. 904. See also Chicago Bureau of
Public Efficiency, Excess Condemnation (No. 34, 1918) 55.
7. See, e. g., United States v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville
(C. C. A. 6, 1935) 78 F. (2d) 684; Wilton v. St. Johns County (1929) 98
Fla. 26, 123 So. 527, 65 A. L. R. 488; Codd v. McGoldrick Lumber Co.
(1929) 48 Idaho 1, 279 Pac. 298, 67 A. L. R. 580; Fountain Park Co. v.
Hensler (1927) 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465, 50 A. L. R. 1518; Ferguson v.
Illinois Cent. R. R. (1926) 202 Iowa 508, 210 N. W. 604, 53 A. L. R. 1;
Paine v. Savage (1927) 126 Me. 121, 136 Atl. 664, 51 A. L. R. 1194;
Nichols v. Central Virginia Power Co. (1926) 143 Va. 405, 130 S. E. 764,
44 A. L. R. 727; State ex reI. Chelan Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1927)
142 Wash. 270, 253 Pac. 115, 58 A. L. R. 779. See also Note (1921) 14
A. L. R. 1350; Note (1929) 68 A. L. R. 837; 20 C. J. 546.
8. Even a statement by the legislature that the purpose is for the public
use is not binding upon the courts. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v.
Bradley (1896) 164 U. S. 112; Sibley v. Volusia County (Fla. 1941) 2 So.
1942]
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will be found no clear definition, for the courts determine what
is a public use by considering all the facts and circumstances in
a particular case.9 The results naturally vary in different locali-
ties because of different economic and social requirements.10 The
present Missouri constitutional provision concerning condemna-
tion is a typical one:
That no private property may be taken for a private use,
with or without compensation, unless by the consent of the
owner, except for private ways of necessity, and for drains
and ditches across the lands of another for agriculture and
sanitary purposes, in such a manner as may be prescribed
by law; and that whenever an attempt is made to take pri-
vate property for an allegedly public use, the question
whether the contemplated use is really public shall be a judi-
cial question, and as such be judicially determined without
regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public."
(2d) 578, 582; Public Service of Indiana v. City of Lebanon (Ind. 1941)
34 N. E. (2d) 20, 21; City of Caruthersville v. Ferguson (Mo. 1920) 226
S. W. 912, 914; City of East Cleveland v. Nau (1931) 124 Ohio St. 433,
179 N. E. 187, 188; Grand River Dam Authority v. Thompson (Okla. 1941)
113 P. (2d) 818, 821.
9. See, e. g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley (1896) 164 U. S.
112, 159-160, where the court said: " * ** -what is a public use frequently
and largely depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the
particular subjeet-matter in regard to which the character of the use is
questioned." See also Clark v. Nash (1905) 198 U. S. 361; Goose Creek
Lumber Co. v. White (1927) 219 Ky. 739, 294 S. W. 494; Strickley v.
Highland Boy Gold Min. Co. (1904) 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac. 296, aff'd (1906)
200 U. S. 527; City of Richmond v. Carneal (1921) 129 Va. 388, 106 S. E.
403.
10. See, e. g., Mather v. Ottawa (1885) 114 Ill. 659, 3 N. E. 216, (water-
way improvement for purpose of furnishing water power to factories held
not a public use); Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler (1927) 199 Ind. 95, 155
N. E. 465 (statute conferring right to use eminent domain upon a chau-
tauqua organization for the purpose of obtaining lands for their meeting
held an invalid use of eminent domain for a non-public purpose) ; Ferguson
v. Illinois Cent. R. R. (1926) 202 Iowa 508, 210 N. W. 604 (erection of
coal shed for coal to be sold for private profit held not a public use for
which property could be taken under eminent domain); Goose Creek Lumber
Co. v. White (1927) 219 Ky. 739, 294 S. W. 494 (tramway for a lumber
company which other companies had the right to use for hire considered
a public use); Arnsperger v. Crawford (1905) 101 Md. 247, 61 At]. 413
(condemnation for a private road not open to the public invalid); Big-
ginson v. Inhabitants of Nahant (Mass. 1866) 11 Allen 530 (condemnation
of shore property to build a pleasure drive which public would be allowed
to use held valid); State v. Aitchison (1934) 96 Mont. 335, 30 P. (2d)
805 (fish and game commission had neither express nor implied power of
eminent domain for purpose of condemning sites for fish rearing ponds);
Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. (1904) 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac.
296, aff'd, (1906) 200 U. S. 527 (condemnation of aerial rights in order
for gold mining company to operate an aerial bucket line held valid);
Attorney General v. Eau Clair (1875) 37 Wis. 400 (dam furnishing water
power to factories came within scope of public use).
11. Mo. Const. (1875) art. II, §20.
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The validity of condemnation under such a provision depends
upon the necessity of taking the land for use in the particular
improvement. If, for example, the improvement cannot be rea-
sonably accomplished without taking the land, the taking comes
within the meaning of public use.12 Otherwise it does not, and
as a consequence, excess condemnation as such is invalid under a
constitutional provision such as that of Missouri.1
3
For purposes of convenience in a discussion of excess condem-
nation, the field is usually divided into three categories: remnant,
restrictive, and recoupment condemnation. The classifications
overlap considerably, however. Remnant condemnation would
give the municipality authority to condemn left-over pieces of
land with the intention of replotting them into usable lots for
the purpose of resale to private individuals. The theory is that
this would avoid unnecessary waste of land and would decrease
the number of unsightly properties that abut upon the improve-
ment. If the remnant is so small or of so little value that the
taking is merely incidental to the taking of land for the public
work, it is possible that the city may obtain title to the property.1 4
However, often the city is required to pay damages equal to the
value of the remnant, but is not allowed to take title to such rem-
nant.15 Should the city attempt to go further and take larger
12. Kansas City S. & C. Ry. Co. v. Meyer (1929) 10 La. App. 521, 120
So. 700; Leslie v. City of St. Louis (1871) 47 Mo. 474; White v. Johnson
(1929) 148 S. C. 488, 146 S. E. 411; State v. Superior Court for Chelan
County (1927) 144 Wash. 124, 257 Pac. 231; State v. Gilliam (1931) 163
Wash. 111, 800 Pac. 173. Where the intended use of the property to be
taken is primarily public, any incidental private use which may result
will not reduce the public nature of the use to which the land is to be put.
Kansas City v. Liebi (1923) 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404, 28 A. L. R. 295.
However, where the intended use is primarily private and only incidentally
public, the fractional public use will not justify the use of the power of
eminent domain.
18. There is some indication that certain types of excess condemnation
might be tried even under a constitutional provision such as that of Mis-
souri. Thus, art. XXI, §16 of the charter of the City of St. Louis (1914)
provides: "Whenever it may be lawfully done, the Board of Aldermen * * *
may provide for the appropriation in fee by the city of private property
or any easement or use therein in excess of that actually required for such
a specific purpose, and in the same or different ordinance may authorize the
sale of such an excess for value with or without restrictions." This pro-
vision, however, is in effect a nullity, and no attempt has been made to
use it.
14. See City of Cincinnati v. Vester (C. C. A. 6, 1929) 33 F. (2d) 242,
244-245, 68 A. L. R. 831; Opinion of Justices (1910) 204 Mass. 616, 91
N. E. 578.
15. See City of Chicago v. Lord (1917) 276 Ill. 544, 549, 115 N. E. 8,
(1917) 277 Ill. 397, 407, 115 N. E. 543. See also Chicago Bureau of Public
Efficiency, Excess Condemnation (No. 34, 1918) 15-17.
Where the property remaining after the appropriation for the public use
19421
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remnants for the purpose of replotting them, there is little doubt
that such action would be invalid under constitutional provisions
similar to that of Missouri."
The object of restrictive condemnation is to condemn for re-
sale subject to restrictions to ensure the purpose and value of
the improvement. The theory is that the public purpose is not
achieved or the value of the improvement is diminished when
the setting of the improvement remains incongruous. However,
statutes authorizing restrictive condemnation have been held in-
valid, 17 as being outside the scope of the concept of public use.
Recoupment condemnation has as its purpose the condemna-
tion and resale of property surrounding an improvement in order
to secure to the public the benefit of any increase in value of
such surrounding property. Although the making of profit from
the resale of lands acquired in connection with public improve-
ments has been an important aim of many foreign cities in re-
sorting to excess condemnation, excess condemnation has been
urged upon American cities primarily for other reasons, and the
recoupment theory has been little favored.'18 Constitutional ob-
stacles are of primary importance. Even when a state has a
is injured by such a taking, the injuries to the property and the damages
to the owner are considered as a whole, and the parcel remaining consti-
tutes a portion of such whole. Springfield & S. Ry. Co. v. Calkins (1886)
90 Mo. 538, 3 S. W. 82; Kansas City & S. R. Co. v. Story (1888) 96 Mo.
611, 10 S. W. 203; Union Elevator Co. v. Kansas City Suburban Belt Ry.
Co. (1896) 135 Mo. 353, 36 S. W. 1071; St. Louis M. & S. E. R. Co. v.
Drummond Realty & Inv. Co. (1907) 205 Mo. 167, 103 S. W. 977.
16. To come within the concept of public use, the property must be
reasonably necessary to the improvement. See cases cited supra note 12.
Cf. Opinion of Justices (1910) 204 Mass. 607, 91 N. E. 405, 27 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 483; Opinion of Justices (1910) 204 Mass. 616, 91 N. E. 578, where
the court intimated that a statute providing for remnant condemnation
would be constitutional.
17. Opinion of Justices (1910) 204 Mass. 616, 91 N. H. 578; Pennsyl-
vania Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia (1913) 242 Pa. 47, 88 At. 904.
18. Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency, Excess Condemnation (No. 34,
1918) 47; Cushman, Excess Condemnation (1917) 134.
19. See Salisbury Land & Improv. Co. v. Commonwealth (1913) 215
Mass. 371, 102 N. E. 619, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1196. There is considerable
overlapping between restrictive and recoupment condemnation. A taking
under statutes which seemingly were aimed primarily toward the former
has been held an unauthorized condemnation on the grounds that recoup-
ment was intended. City of Richmond v. Carneal (1921) 129 Va. 388, 106
S. E. 403, 14 A. L. R. 1341 arose under a statute which seemed to provide
for restrictive condemnation, but the case was decided as if recoupment
condemnation were the only thing concerned, and the taking was held in-
valid. In Opinion of Justices (1910) 204 Mass. 607, 610, 91 N. E. 405, 27
L. R. A. (N. S.) 483, it was said: "It is plain that a use of the property
to obtain the possible income or profit that might inure to the city from
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constitutional provision validating excess condemnation in some
situations, recoupment condemnation has been declared invalid
under the Fourteenth AmendmentY
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled directly
upon the validity of excess condemnation, although it has held
that in order to have a valid condemnation under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the taking must be for a public use. 1 Each case
involving the doctrine of public use has been decided upon its
own facts and circumstances. 22
An approach toward the authorization of excess condemnation
has been made in several states by means of constitutional pro-
visions. These vary as to the extent and purpose of the excess
the ownership and control of it would not be a public use." See also Note
(1930) 68 A. L. R. 837, and cases cited, where it is said that the authorities
seem to be uniform that eminent domain cannot be exercised to condemn
land in excess of needs for public uses.
20. Cincinnati v. Vester (C. C. A. 6, 1929) 33 F. (2d) 242, 245, involved
a condemnation under the Ohio constitutional provision. The court said:
"If it means * * * that the property may be taken for the purpose of selling
it at a profit and paying for the improvement, it is clearly invalid. * * *
As applied by the city in this case it violates the due process clause of the
Constitution." The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court
but was disposed of upon other grounds (1930) 281 U. S. 439.
21. Missouri Pacific v. Nebraska (1896) 164 U. S. 403; Cincinnati v.
Louisville (1912) 233 U. S. 389. See also Dalche v. Board of Commis-
sioners of Orleans Levee Board (1931) 49 F. (2d) 374; Foley Securities
Corp. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev. (C. C. A. 8, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 731; Bascom v.
Industrial Accident Comm. (1938) 25 Cal. App. (2d) 334, 77 P. (2d) 305;
Roberts v. City of Detroit (1927) 241 Mich. 71, 216 N. W. 410.
22. There is no precise rule or rules that can be deduced from the deci-
sions as to what constitutes a public use. There are certain recurring
factors, however. It is not essential that the use be by a public govern-
mental agency. See, e. g., Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co.
(1889) 135 U. S. 641. And even though a public governmental agency is
itself to use the property, an otherwise invalid use will not be validated.
Opinion of Justices (1910) 204 Mass. 607, 91 N. E. 405, 27 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 483. The condemnation of property for use in connection with
performance of a governmental function is proper. Shoemaker v. U. S.
(1892) 147 U. S. 282. It is, of course, a valid condemnation if the property
taken is to be used by the public, and this principle has been extended to
include a use which is of widespread general public benefit, though not
involving any right on the part of the general public itself to use" the
property. See Fallbrook Irr. Dist. v. Bradley (1895) 164 U. S. 112; Clark v.
Nash (1904) 198 U. S. 361; Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.
(1904) 28 Utah 215, 78 Pac. 296, aff'd (1905) 200 U. S. 527; Mt. Vernon-
Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co. (1915) 240
U. S. 30. For further discussion of this subject, see Rottschaefer, Consti-
tutional Law (1939) 697 et seq. For some further cases involving interest-
ing fact situations, see Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. (1896) 113 U. S. 9;
Missouri Pacific R. R. v. Nebraska (1896) 164 U. S. 403; Chicago R. Co. v.
Illinois (1906) 200 U. S. 561; Weaner v. Pennsylvania-Ohio Power & Light
Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1926) 10 F. (2d) 759.
1942]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss3/14
472 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
condemnation.23 The provision in the Model State Constitution4
would give cities power:
To establish and alter the location of streets, to make local
public improvements, and to acquire by condemnation or
otherwise property, within its corporate limits, necessary
for such improvements, and also to acquire additional prop-
erty in order to preserve and protect such improvements,
and to lease or sell such additional property, with restric-
tions to preserve and protect the improvements.
This particular provision has not been adopted in any state. The
Ohio constitutional provision 25 approximates it, but adds the safe-
guard that the municipality acquiring property for the public use
may "in the furtherance of such a public use" appropriate an
excess over that actually to be occupied by the improvement. The
addition of the phrase, "in the furtherance of" the public use,
might well be a safeguard upon which a court would look kindly
in determining the validity of a condemnation under the provi-
sion.26 When the courts are called upon to interpret what will
23. Constitutional provisions have been adopted in California, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Ohio, New York, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. The
Wisconsin provision (Wis. Const. (1848) art. XI, §3a, (adopted 1912)) and
the Michigan provision (Mich. Const. (1909) art. XIII, §5 (adopted 1908))
allow an excess condemnation for the purpose of insuring the adequacy of
the amount of land taken. Any land remaining after the appropriation for
the improvement is made may be sold, retained, or leased as the city sees
fit. These provisions do not contemplate a taking of the property with the
intent of resale. It is merely that the property remaining is property of
the city to be disposed of in aiy reasonable manner. See Emmons v. City
of Detroit (1931) 255 Mich. 558, 238 N. W. 188.
N. Y. Const. (1895) art. I, §7(3), (adopted 1913), Mass. Const. (1790)
Amend. 39, (adopted 1911), and R. I. Const. (1843) art. XVII (adopted
1916) more nearly approach an orthodox excess condemnation, in that they
provide that private property may be condemned in excess of that needed
for the public improvement, but only in an amount sufficient for suitable
building lots abutting on the improvement, the lots to be retained, Bold, or
leased. Massachusetts and Rhode Island add in addition that the lots may
be sold or leased "with or without restrictions." The New York provision
is mute on this subject. Conceivably, this difference might be important
in construing the provisions, or even in determining their constitutionality
under the Federal Constitution. For the Ohio and California provisions, see
note 25, infra.
24. (4th rev. ed. 1941) §804(e).
25. Ohio Const. (1851) art. XVIII, §10 (adopted 1912). The California
provision (Cal. Const. (1879) art. I, §14:A (adopted 1928)) is somewhat
similar. It makes provision for restrictive condemnation, but provides that
only land within 150 feet of the improvement may be condemned.
26. The Ohio provision -was before the United States Supreme Court in
Cincinnati v. Vester (1930) 281 U. S. 439. The court did not decide as to
its constitutionality. Statutory safeguards have been added under this pro-
vision. For example, there is a requirement that the municipality which
desires to use excess condemnation must state the purpose of such condemna-
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be a "furtherance" of the public use under this provision, a more
liberal standard may be applied than is applied under the Mis-
souri and similar provisions which do not contain this clause.27
It would not be necessary that the land itself be used directly
for the public improvement, nor that the improvement be in-
capable of accomplishment without it. If it can be demonstrated
to the satisfaction of the court that the condemnation is in the
furtherance of use by the public, the condemnation will be valid.
We see, then, that in the absence of some constitutional pro-
vision, very little can be done in the way of excess condemnation.
Various alternative solutions have been suggested. It has been
indicated that results sought under restrictive condemnation
might be achieved through the use of zoning.28 The difficulty with
this suggestion is that only subsequent uses can be restricted;
the use to which the property is being put at the time of the
zoning may not be changed.&2 9 In addition, the validity of zoning
for purely aesthetic purposes is not definitely established. 30 Yet
tion in the ordinance giving rise to the taking (Ohio Gen. Code (Page,
1926) §3679.) It must also be prepared to prove that the taking is in the
furtherance of the public use. This safeguard was read into the constitu-
tional provision as an implied guaranty that the power would be properly
used. See City of East Cleveland v. Nau (1931) 124 Ohio St. 433, 179
N. E. 187.
27. See, however, City of East Cleveland v. Nau (1931) 124 Ohio St.
488, 179 N. E. 187, where an ordinance proposed a condemnation of 130
feet on either side of a proposed road widening, in order to grade % of
an inch per foot. The purpose stated in the ordinance was not sufficient
to constitute a "furtherance of the public use." The grading could have
been accomplished within 10 to 20 feet.
28. Steiner, Excess Condemnation (1938) 3 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 14. See
Kansas City v. Liebi (1923) 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404. There it was
held that the use of eminent domain to place restrictions upon property
abutting on an improvement was valid, as the taking of the individual
rights of the owners was for a public use. Only the subsequent use of the
property was to be restricted.
29. City of Little Rock v. Pfeifer (1925) 169 Ark. 1027, 277 S. W. 1027;
London v. Robinson (1928) 94 Cal. App. 774, 271 Pac. 921; Brougher v.
Board of Public Works of San Francisco (1930) 107 Cal. App. 15, 290 Pac.
140; Nelson v. Town of Belmont (1931) 274 Mass. 35, 174 N. E. 320;
Jenney v. Hynes (1933) 282 Mass. 182, 184 N. E. 820; City of St. Louis v.
Evraiff (1923) 301 Mo. 231, 256 S. W. 489; Rosenberg v. Village of White-
fish Bay (1929) 199 Wis. 214, 225 N. W. 838. A different question might
arise, of course, if a regulation for moral, health, or sanitary reasons were
involved.
30. Where zoning was not for the furtherance of public health, morals,
or sanitation, but for aesthetic purposes, it has been invalidated. Karke
Realty Associates v. Mayor, etc. of Jersey City (1927) 104 N. J. Law
178, 139 Atl. 55; State ex rel. Srigley v. Woodworth (1929) 33 Ohio App.
406, 169 N. E. 713. On the other hand, in some instances the courts have
sustained zoning regulations primarily for aesthetic purposes. State ex rel.
Civillo v. New Orleans (1923) 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440; State ex rel. Twin
City Bldg. Co. v. Houghton (1920) 144 Minn. 1, 176 N. W. 159; St. Louis
1942]
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another suggested solution as a substitute for restrictive con-
demnation is the condemnation of an easement, whereby the
owners of property give up the right to use it for certain pur-
poses and are compensated for so doing.31 This solution would
go further than zoning, since undesirable structures could be
removed. The argument against restrictive condemnation would
be largely overcome, since no more of the property owner's rights
would be taken than necessary, and there would be no grounds
for saying that proprty was taken from one person and placed
in the hands of another private person.
In lieu of recoupment condemnation, increment taxes have been
suggested. Such taxes would take from the owner of the property
any increase in the value of his property due to the improve-
ment.32 This would assure to the community the benefit of in-
creases in the value of property resulting from public expendi-
ture on the improvement, and the method would seem to sur-
mount the objections to recoupment condemnation, although dif-
ferent constitutional questions might arise.
There are, of course, numerous arguments for and against
the various types of excess condemnation from a social and eco-
nomic standpoint. The legal problem is involved, but it seems
clear that constitutional authorization is necessary. The problem
is certainly one which might well merit the attention of a consti-
tutional convention.
X. O'B. I.
Gunning Adv. Co. v. City of St. Louis (1911) 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929;
State ex rel. Carter v. Harper (1923) 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451. For
discussions of the subject, see Baker, Aesthetic Zoning Regulations (1926)
25 Mich. L. Rev. 124; Light, Aesthetics in Zoning (1930) 14 Minn. L. Rev.
109; Note (1931) 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 428. See also Note (1942) 27 WAsHING-
TON U. LAW QUARTERLY 459.
31. See Attorney General v. Williams (1899) 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E.
77, where the city of Boston took the right of property owners to build
buildings of more than ten stories on the property surrounding Copley
Square. The property owners were compensated for giving up the right to
build skyscrapers. Cf. Kansas City v. Liebi (1923) 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W.
404, supra note 28.
32. Increment taxes have been used in Europe. Such taxes would take
from the property owner any increase in value of his property resulting
from the improvement. Whereas special benefit taxes are limited to a
percentage of the total cost of the improvement, there is no limit to the
amount which can be collected by means of increment taxes. It is possible
even that the amount of tax collected may be greater than the cost of the
improvement. Difficulties arise in determining the amount of increase in
value of the property. Increases may not result for a considerable time
after completion of the improvement. Cushman, Excess Condemnation
(1917) 129 et seq.
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